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Transportation and Motor Vehicles
Transportation and Motor Vehicles; alleys-restriction of vehicular and
pedestrian access
Vehicle Code § 21102.1 (new).
AB 356 (W. Murray & Kuykendall); 1995 STAT. Ch. 215
Under existing law, local authorities I may, under certain circumstances, adopt
ordinances or resolutions that prohibit or restrict the use of streets,2 roads,3 and
highways4 under their jurisdiction.
1. See CAL VEH. CODE § 385 (West 1987) (defining "local authorities" as the legislative bodies of
every county or municipality having authority to adopt local police regulations).
2. See id. § 590 (West 1987) (defining "street" as a way or place publicly maintained and open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel; street includes highway).
3. See id. § 527 (West 1987) (defining "road" as any existing vehicle route established before January
1, 1979, with significant evidence of prior regular travel by vehicles subject to registration pursuant to
California Vehicle Code §§ 4000-4021; provided that road does not mean any route traversed exclusively by
bicycles as defined in California Vehicle Code § 39001, motorcycles as defined in California Vehicle Code
§ 400, motor-driven cycles as defined in California Vehicle Code § 405. or off-highway motor vehicles as
defined in California Vehicle Code § 38012); see also id. § 400 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "motorcycle" as
a motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider, designed to travel on not more than three wheels
in contact with the ground, and weighing less than 1500 pounds); id. § 405 (West Supp. 1995) (defining
"motor-driven cycle" as any motorcycle with a motor which displaces less than 150 cubic centimeters, and
every bicycle with a motor attached); id. § 38012 (West 1985) (defining "off-highway motor vehicle" as
including the following: (1) any motorcycle or motor-driven cycle, except for any motorcycle which is eligible
for a special transportation identification device; (2) any snowmobile or other vehicle designed to travel over
snow or ice; (3) any motor vehicle commonly referred to as a sand buggy, dune buggy, or all-terrain vehicle;
and (4) any motor vehicle commonly referred to as ajeep); id. § 39001 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the
licensing and registration of bicycles). See generally id. §§ 4000-5500 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
registration of vehicles and certificates of title).
4. See id. § 360 (West 1987) (defining "highway" as a way or place of any nature-including a stree
publicly maintained and open to the public for vehicular travel).
5. Id. §§ 21101,21101.4,21102 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 21101 (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing
local authorities, for those highways under their jurisdiction, to adopt rules and regulations on the following
matters: (1) closing any highway to vehicular traffic when, in the opinion of the legislative body having
jurisdiction, the highway is no longer needed for vehicular traffic; (2) prohibiting the use of particular
highways by certain vehicles; (3) closing particular streets during regular school hours for the purpose of
conducting automobile driver training programs in secondary schools and colleges; and (4) temporarily closing
a portion of any street for celebrations, parades, local special events, and other purposes when the closing is
necessary for the protection and safety of those who will use that portion of the street during the temporary
closing); id. § 21101.4 (West Supp. 1995) (allowing a local authority to, by ordinance or resolution, adopt rules
and regulations for temporarily closing to through traffic a highway under its jurisdiction when all of the
following conditions are found to exist after a public hearing: (1) the local authority determines that there is
serious and continual criminal activity in the portion of the highway recommended for temporary closure; this
finding and determination must be based upon the recommendation of the police department or, in the case of
a highway in an unincorporated area, on the joint recommendation of the sheriff's department and the
Department of the California Highway Patrol; (2) the highway has not been designated as a through highway
or arterial street; (3) vehicular or pedestrian traffic on the highway contributes to the criminal activity; (4) the
closure will not substantially adversely affect the operation of emergency vehicles, the performance of
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Chapter 215 authorizes local authorities, by ordinance or resolution, to restrict
vehicular6 or pedestrian7 traffic8 through an alley? by means of gates, barriers, or
other control devices, when necessary for the protection or preservation of the
public peace, safety, health, or welfare.'" However, Chapter 215 is subject to
certain conditions." For one, the ordinance or resolution cannot be enforced until
appropriate signs giving notice of the restriction are posted at every entrance to
the alley. 12 Furthermore, within the coastal zone, 3 where the alley provides direct
municipal or public utility services, or the delivery of freight by commercial vehicles in the area of the highway
proposed to be temporarily closed; and (5) a highway may be temporarily closed pursuant to California Vehicle
Code § 21101.4(a) for not more than 18 months, except that period may, pursuant to § 21101.4(a), be extended
for one additional period of not more than 18 months); id. § 21102 (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that local
authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution closing to vehicular traffic that portion
of any street or highway crossing or dividing any school ground or grounds when such closing is necessary
for the protection of those attending such areas).
6. See iU. § 670 (West 1987) (defining "vehicle" as a device by which any person or property may be
propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks).
7. See id. § 467 (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "pedestrian" as any person who is afoot or who is using
a means of conveyance propelled by human power other than a bicycle); id. (noting that pedestrian includes
any person who is operating a self-propelled wheelchair, invalid tricycle, or motorized quadricycle and, by
reason of physical disability, is otherwise unable to move about as a pedestrian, as specified in California
Vehicle Code § 467(a)).
8. See id. § 620 (West 1987) (including within the definition of "traffic" pedestrians, ridden animals,
vehicles, street cars, and other conveyances, either singly or together, while using any highway for purposes
of travel).
9. See id. § 110 (West 1987) (defining "alley" as any highway having a roadway not exceeding 25 feet
in width which is primarily used for access to the rear or side entrances of abutting property; however, the City
and County of San Francisco may designate as an alley, by ordinance or resolution, any highway having a
roadway not exceeding 25 feet in width); see also 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 833, sec. 2, at 2432 (amending CAL. VEIt.
CODE § 110) (declaring that the Legislature finds that due to circumstances peculiar to the City and County of
San Francisco, it is necessary that such city and county be authorized to designate highways with roadways
not exceeding 25 feet in width as alleys).
10. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21102.1 (enacted by Chapter 215); see id. (permitting local authorities to adopt
rules and regulations restricting vehicular or pedestrian traffic through any alley by means of gates, barriers,
or other control devices, when the restriction is necessary for the protection or preservation of the public peace,
safety, health, or welfare, subject to certain conditions); see also Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 2d
60, 67, 47 P.2d 474, 477 (1935) (holding that a street closing to vehicular traffic by the City Council of Los
Angeles for the purpose of protecting the lives, health, safety and general welfare of the people of the city, was
within its police power because the closing was warranted and within constitutional limits; furthermore, the
closing of the street did not deprive the plaintiff's property of all vehicular access and the damage to the
property was incidental to the exercise by the city of its lawful powers).
11. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21102.1 (enacted by Chapter 215).
12. Id. § 21102.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 215); see id. § 21103 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that no
ordinance or resolution enacted under California Vehicle Code § 21101 will be effective until signs giving
notice of the local traffic laws are posted at all entrances to the highway or part thereof affected).
13. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30103(a) (West Supp. Pamphlet 1995) (defining "coastal zone" as that
land and water area of the State of California from the Oregon border to the border of the Republic of Mexico,
extending seaward to the state's outer limit ofjurisdiction, including all offshore islands, and extending inland
generally 1,000 yards from the mean high tide line of the sea); id. (providing that the coastal zone does not
include the area ofjurisdiction of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, nor any
area contiguous thereto, including any river, stream, tributary, creek, or flood control or drainage channel
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access to any public beach' 4 or state waters, the local authority must comply with
the California Coastal Act.' 5 Within the area administered by the San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission,' 6 the local authority must first
obtain concurrence by, or on behalf of, the commission to restrict an alley that
provides direct access to any public beach, state waters, or wetlands.'
7
Chapter 215 further requires access to be provided to utility vehicles, and
does not prohibit the delivery of freight by commercial vehicles.'8 Moreover,
Chapter 215 prohibits any ordinance or resolution from being implemented in a
manner that adversely affects the operation of emergency vehicles or the per-
formance of municipal services. 9 Lastly, Chapter 215 provides that no ordinance
or resolution can be adopted that restricts the access of certain members of the
flowing into such area).
14. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54090 (West 1983) (defining "public beach" as any beach area used for
recreational purposes which is owned, operated or controlled by the State, any state agency or any local
agency).
15. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21102.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 215); see CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900
(West 1986 & Supp. Pamphlet 1995) (setting forth the California Coastal Act of 1976); id. § 30001.5 (West
1986) (declaring that a goal of the state for the coastal zone is to maximize public access to and along the coast
and maximize public recreational opportunities consistent with sound conservation principles and constitu-
tionally protected rights of private property owners); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining the "public trust doctrine" as providing that submerged and submersible lands are preserved for
public use in navigation, fishing and recreation, and the state, as trustee for the people, bears responsibility for
preserving and protecting the right of the public to use the waters for those purposes); Susan D. Baer,
Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection
of Public Land and Its Resources, 15 B.C. ENvT. AFF. L. REV. 385, 400 (1988) (declaring that the public trust
doctrine has developed to the point where there is at least an implicit legal right vested in the public); Timothy
P. Brady, Comment, "But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:" The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA,
and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENv'L AFF. L. REv. 621,624-29 (1990) (discussing the emergence of the
Public Trust Doctrine); Alice G. Carmichael, Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access
to North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C. L. REV. 159, 160 (1985) (commenting that the trend in most jurisdictions
is toward recognition of a legal right of the public to access and use of the beaches, although the nature of these
rights varies from state to state). See generally 4 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property
§ 90 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing the California Coastal Act of 1976).
16. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600-66650 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (describing the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission).
17. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21102.1(c) (enacted by Chapter 215); see id. (noting that the concurrence or
objection must be based on the permits issued by the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission); see also CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30121 (West 1986) (defining "wetland" as lands within the
coastal zone which may be covered periodically or permanently with shallow water and lands that are saltwater
marshes, freshwater marshes, open or closed brackish water marshes, swamps, mudflats, and fens).
18. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21102.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 215); id. § 21102.1(e) (enacted by Chapter 215);
see id. § 21102.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 215) (noting that the local authority must provide access to utility
vehicular or pedestrian traffic in order that the utility may maintain, operate, replace, remove, or renew existing
and functioning utility facilities); see also id. § 260 (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "commercial vehicle" as
a vehicle of a type required to be registered under the Vehicle Code which is used for the transportation of
persons for profit, or used primarily for the transportation of property); id. § 22512 (West Supp. 1995) (listing
other provisions that do not apply to the driver or owner of any service vehicle owned or operated by or for,
or operated under contract with, a utility or public utility).
19. Id. § 21102.1(0 (enacted by Chapter 215).
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public to the alleys, while permitting others unrestricted access to the alleys.20
COMMENT
The League of California Cities and the City of Long Beach sponsored
Chapter 215 because alleys have become convenient locations for crime and other
nuisancesY Under current law, local authorities can temporarily close alleys or
highways under their jurisdiction if, among other requirements, the appropriate
local law enforcement agency recommends that the facility be closed due to
serious and continuing criminal activity on the roadway.22 Chapter 215 expands
the reasons for restricting access to an alley to include any purpose determined
to be necessary for the protection or preservation of public peace, health, safety,
or welfare.2
Michelle M. Sheidenberger
20. Id. § 21102.1(g) (enacted by Chapter 215).
21. ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMMIT"EEANALYSIS oFAB 356, at 2 (May 18, 1995); see Michael Krikorian,
Los Angeles City Hall Journal: A Summary of Selected City Hall Actions This Week Affecting Central Los
Angeles, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 2 (noting that the Los Angeles city council approved a Public Works
Committee report that establishes guidelines for temporarily closing streets, alleys or walkways becasuse of
criminal activity; however, certain conditions must be met before a closure, which would be for 18 months,
can be imposed); id. (listing the conditions for temporarily closing streets, alleys or walkways because of
criminal activity as the following: (1) the existence of serious and continual criminal activity at the site; (2)
vehicular or pedestrian traffic that contributes to the criminal activity; (3) agreement to the closure by
surrounding property owners; and (4) evidence that the closure will not adversely affect public utility services
or emergency vehicle operations); Lucille Renwick, The Great Blight Way: Alleys Have Become a Magnet for
Illegal Dumping and Crime. A City Pilot Project Hopes to Change That, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at 14
(commenting that alleys have become lairs where prostitutes conduct business, thieves escape from police, and
crack addicts score drugs; Los Angeles spends about $6 million a year to clean up the alleys, most of which
are in South Los Angeles); id. (stating that in an effort to clean up nuisance alleys plagued by crime and illegal
dumping, at least six alleys in South-Central Los Angeles were closed; furthermore, Los Angeles will turn the
city-owned land over to the adjacent land property owners for community gardens and other recreational uses);
Hannelore Sudermann, Residents Hope Gated Alleys Put a Lock on Crime, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 6, 1995,
at NI (describing the City of Sacramento's plan to gate alleys to curb the crime and dumping); Walt Yost, City
Council May Attempt to Close Gates on Alley Crime, SACRAMENTo BEE, Aug. 4, 1994, at N3 (quoting
Councilwoman Deborah Ortiz as saying that the city of Sacramento spends $200,000 a year cleaning up illegal
dumping in alleys, plus countless hours of police and fire department time are spent on alley problems; the
savings to gate and close 50 city alleys will far exceed the costs); id. (noting that an Elmhurst resident told the
Sacramento City Council that there has been an increase in vehicular and foot traffic using the alleys in her
neighborhood, which has resulted in increased vandalism, illegal dumping, prostitution, and drug use).
22. CAL VEH. CODE § 21101.4(a)(l) (West Supp. 1995).
23. Id. § 21102.1 (enacted by Chapter 215); ASsEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 356, at
2 (May 18, 1995).
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Transportation and Motor Vehicles; dealers-unlawful acts
Business and Professions Code § 17537.7 (new); Vehicle Code §
11713.11 (new); § 11713.1 (amended).
AB 192 (Cannella); 1995 STAT. Ch. 585
Existing law authorizes the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue licenses1
to vehicle2 dealers3 and prohibits the holder of any vehicle dealer's license from
doing any one or more of various proscribed acts.4 Existing law specifies require-
1. See CAL. VEts. CODE § 11700 (West Supp. 1995) (indicating that no person shall act as a dealer
without a license as required in California Vehicle Code § 11701); see also id § 11701 (West 1987) (providing
that a dealer in vehicles subject to registration must apply to the Department of Motor Vehicles for a license
containing a general distinguishing number); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-310(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (listing
similar, but more specific requirements, to those of California).
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 670 (West 1987) (defining a "vehicle" as a device moved by some source
other than human power or upon stationary tracks or rails which is propelled or moved upon the highway).
3. See id. § 285(a) (West 1987) (defining a "vehicle dealer" as one who does not fall within the
exceptions of California Vehicle Code § 286, but who negotiates or attempts to negotiate, a sale or exchange
of an interest in a vehicle subject to registration); id. § 285(b) (West 1987) (providing one who is engaged
wholly or in part in the business of selling vehicles or buying or taking in trade, vehicles for the purpose of
resale, selling, or offering for resale is a vehicle dealer); id § 286 (West Supp. 1995) (listing exceptions to the
definition of "dealer," such as insurance companies, banks, and salespersons employed by vehicle dealers);
cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2401(a) (1991) (defining "vehicle dealer" as any person who buys sells or negotiates
a sale of an interest in a vehicle for money, or is involved in the auction of the vehicles for money).
4. CAL. VEI. CODE § 11713.1 (amended by Chapter 585); see id. (providing a list of violations of this
code for the holder of a dealer license, such as misrepresenting fees, using bait and switch techniques, and
failing to disclose information in a conspicuous manner); see also id. § 1651 (West 1987) (providing that the
director of the Department of Motor Vehicles may adopt and enforce rules and regulations as necessary to carry
out the provisions of this code relating to the department); id. § 11614(a)-(v) (West Supp. 1995) (limiting what
a lessor-retailer licensed under this chapter can do, for example, limiting methods of advertising, requiring
certain price disclosures, or misrepresenting fees); cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1251 (West 1989) (setting forth
Louisiana's policy reasons for requiring licensing as the effect on the general economy, public interest, and
the public welfare, making it necessary to regulate). See generally Auchard v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 715
P.2d 1298 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (assessing the notice provision for the state of Kansas with respect to
auctioning of seized vehicles, the code reading, in part, that reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale shall be sent by the secured creditor to the debtor).
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ments that dealers must satisfy for advertising5 vehicles. 6 It is a misdemeanor to
violate those provisions
Chapter 585 makes it unlawful to advertise for sale or purchase any new
vehicle of a line-make for which the dealer does not hold a franchise.8 Chapter
585, however, does not apply to specified categories of vehicles.' Chapter 585
prohibits a dealer from auctioning to the public any vehicle without disclosing,
among other things, the date of the public auction, the location, whether a fee will
be charged, and the name and dealer number of the auctioning dealer.'0
Additionally, in the event any of the cars to be auctioned were acquired as a result
of a seizure by a federal, state or local agency, then additional information must
be clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the advertisement. " A dealer must also
5. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 255.00(a) (1993) (defining "advertising" as any statement,
representation, act or announcement intentionally communicated to any member of the public by any means
whatsoever, either oral, in writing or otherwise); id. § 260.00 (1993) (indicating that advertisments for the sale
of vehicles shall be clearly set forth and are subject to Title 13 regulations and the California Vehicle Code);
see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12024.6 (West 1987) (banning edvertising intended to entice customers
into a transaction other than that which was originally intended); id. § 17500 (West 1987) (prohibiting the
dissemination of false or misleading advertisements and defining "advertising" as inducing the public, in any
statement, to enter into any obligation, through the making or disseminating or causing to be made or dis-
seminated before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 11614(o) (West Supp. 1995) (noting that it is unlawful to advertise when there is no intent
to supply the reasonable expected demand, absent a disclosure of a quantity limitation).
6. CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.1(d)-(f) (amended by Chapter 585); see id. (indicating what must be
included in the advertised price, method of identifying the vehicle, what constitutes an advertisement, and
various other specifications); see also id. § 11713(a) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying advertising practices which
are unlawful, including refusal to sell a vehicle at the advertised price).
7. Id § 40000.1 l(a) (West 1985); see id (discussing violations which are misdemeanors, such a&, those
relating to occupational licensing and business regulations); see also id. § 42002 (West 1985) (indicating that
absent an express provision in this code, anyone found guilty of a misdemeanor under any provision of this
code shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both
a fine and imprisonment).
8. CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.1(f) (amended by Chapter 585).
9. Id. § 11713.1(f)(2) (amended by Chapter 585); see id. (lisitng nonapplicable vehicle sales, including
that subdivision (f) does not apply to mobile-homes, recreational vehicles, comercial coaches, off-highway
motor vehicles, manufactured homes, a vehicle that will be substantially altered by a converter prior to sale,
a commerical vehicle with a gross vehicle weight in excess of 10,000 pounds, and a vehicle purchased for
export and exported outside the United States without being registered by the department).
10. Id. § 11713.11(a)(1)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 585).
11. CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.1 1(b)(1), (2) (enacted by Chapter 585); see id. (requiring a good faith
estimate of the number of vehicles to be auctioned at that date, and a good faith estimate of the number of
vehicles seized by a federal, state or local public agency or authority to be auctioned at that date); see also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11470(e) (West Supp. 1995) (listing a variety of controlled substances which, if
a person's vehicle was used to facilitate the possession for sale or sale of these substances, would result in the
forfeiture of the vehicle). See generally Darren M. Allen, Barnes to Alter Policies of Narcotics Task Force,
BALTIMORE SuN, Dec. 18, 1994, at lB (giving an example of a police department and district attorney's office
who use civil forfeitures as a way of increasing the capabilities of local law enforcement by providing high tech
computers, office buildings, new cars and personnel, even though their tactics have been called into que,;tion);
David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at 70 (citing statistics which
show that Federal agencies have netted $3.6 billion dollars in assets since 1984 through the execution of nearly
200,000 forfeitures).
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identify each vehicle which was seized by a federal, state, or local agency.
12
Finally, Chapter 585 makes it illegal for an advertisement to contain the terms
"invoice," "dealer's invoice," "wholesale price" or other terms which refer to the
dealer's cost. 3
COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 585 is to provide protection to potential purchasers
of asset seizure vehicles.' 4 The advertising requirements reduce confusion to
potential buyers from misleading statements.' 5 Quite often asset seizure vehicles
are sold at auction and at times very few asset seizure vehicles are actually for
sale at the auction in relation to vehicles obtained from other sources. 6
Andrei F. B. Behdjet
Transportation and Motor Vehicles; driver's license examinations
Vehicle Code § 14610.5 (amended).
SB 307 (Wright); 1995 STAT. Ch. 243
Under existing law, it is unlawful for any individual to commit specified acts
of cheating on a driver's license examination. Prior law made a first conviction
12. CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.11(c) (enacted by Chapter 585); see id. (requiring the notification to be
presented on a printed form or orally before the bidding on the vehicle begins).
13. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17537.7 (enacted by Chapter 585); see id. (indicating that a dealer
cannot advertise that the price of the vehicle is above, below, or at the manufacturer's or distributor's invoice
or selling price or the dealer's cost); see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.1(n) (amended by Chapter 585)
(containing the same requirement as California Business and Professions Code § 17537.7 that advertisements
not contain certain specified terms); id. § 1 1713(n)(2)(A), (B) (amended by Chapter 585) (providing two ex-
ceptions to § 11713.1(n), which are: (1) allowing the use of the vehicle's invoice price if the customer initiates
the communication with the dealer; and (2) limiting the application of § 11713.1(n) if the communication
between the dealer and prospective commercial purchaser is not disseminated to the general public).
14. ASSEMBLY COMMtTrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 192, at 2 (Apr. 3,
1995); see id. (announcing that the purpose of the bill is to require the number of asset seizure vehicles and
those purchased by the dealer for resale to be disclosed in any newspaper advertising).
15. ASSEmBLY ComfrTTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS. COMMirrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 192, at 2 (May 17,
1995); see id. (stating the bill would address the potential confusion by requiring advertising to disclose the
number of vehicles for auction which are asset seizure vehicles, on consignement or from regular dealer
inventory); id. (inferring that dealers sometimes auction off vehicles which are not asset seizure vehicles,
leading to consumer confusion with respect to what is being bought).
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMM=TTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 192, at 1-2 (Apr. 3,
1995); see id. (commenting that asset seizure vehicles are generally sold at auction by licensed dealers).
1. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14610.5(a) (amended by Chapter 243); see id. (establishing that it is unlawful
to (1) sell, offer for sale, distribute, or use any crib sheet or cribbing device that contains the answers to any
examination; and (2) impersonate or allow the impersonation of an applicant for any class of driver's license);
see also id. § 273 (West 1987) (defining "crib sheet" or "cribbing device" as any paper or device used for
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of this prohibition punishable as an infraction,2 while making a second or sub-
sequent conviction punishable as a misdemeanor. Chapter 243 allows a first time
conviction to be punishable as either an infraction or a misdemeanor depending
on the circumstances.4
COMMENT
Chapter 243 is intended to reduce cheating incidents on the written portion
of driver's license examinations.5 Proponents of Chapter 243 argued that
increasing the potential penalty for cheating violations would decrease the
cheating by supplying examination answers to an applicant for the purpose of fraudulently qualifying the
applicant for any class of driver's license); id. § 310 (West 1987) (defining "driver's license" as a valid license
to drive motor vehicles for which the individual is licensed to driver under the California Vehicle Code or
another foreign jurisdiction's code); id. § 12501 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that officers and employees of the
United States, when operating United States owned vehicles while conducting official business, any individual
while driving implements of husbandry incidentally operated on a highway, or any individual operating an off-
highway motor vehicle is exempt from the requirement of obtaining a driver's license); id. § 12803 (West
1987) (requiring the Department of Motor Vehicles to give an applicant for an original license an examination);
id. § 12809(d) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the Department of Motor Vehicles can refuse to i'sue or
renew a driver's licenses to any individual if that individual has impersonated another in making an application
for a license or in taking any test); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.22(l)(6) (West Supp. 1995) (expressing that
it is a misdemeanor to take any part of a driver's license examination for another or to permit another to take
the examination for that person); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1-60(l)(e), (2) (1989) (providing that it is a
misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of $500, or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or both,
to take a driver's license examination for another or to use any other name on the driver's license application
in an attempt to take the examination for another).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 19.8 (West Supp. 1995) (expressing that a conviction of any violation
which is an infraction, unless a lesser maximum fine is expressly provided, is punishable by a fine not
exceeding $250).
3. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 960, sec. 2, at 3337 (enacting CAL. VEH. CODE § 14610.5(b)); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that a felony is a crime which is punishable by death or imprisonment
in state prison, and all other crimes are misdemeanors, except those classified as infractions); see also id. § 19
(West 1988) (providing that except where a different punishment is prescribed, every offense classified as a
misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not
exceeding $1000, or both); id. § 19.2 (West Supp. 1995) (explaining that the maximum punishment for a
misdemeanor, unless convicted of more than one offense when consecutive sentences have been imposed, is
imprisonment not in excess of one year).
4. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14610.5(b) (amended by Chapter 243); see id. § 42001(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(stating that any person convicted of an infraction for a violation of the California Vehicle Code is subject to
(1) a $100 fine for the first offense, (2) a fine not to exceed $200 for a second infraction occurring within one
year of a prior infraction, or (3) a $250 fine for a third or subsequent infraction occurring within one year of
two or more prior infractions); see also Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 837, 300 P.2d 187, 193
(1956) (holding that despite the fact that California Penal Code § 19 specifies that misdemeanors are generally
punished by fines up to $500, the Legislature may provide a different scale of punishments for violations of
the vehicle code-including a minimum fine that must be imposed).
5. ASSEMLYCOM.,nroxAPPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSB 307, at I (July 5, 1995);
see id. (stating that individuals have paid others to complete the written portion of the driver's license
examination); see also SENATE COMMrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDUF, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 307, at
2 (Apr. 18, 1995) (describing a situation in Senator Cathie Wright's district in which individuals were found
to be paying others to take the driver's license examination).
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likelihood of the offenses occurring and/or increase the likelihood of the offense
being prosecuted.6 On the other hand, opponents of Chapter 243 argue that
already overcrowded jails should not be filled with first-time minor offenders!
Timothy J. Moroney
Transportation and Motor Vehicles; taxicab licensing and certificate of
public convenience and necessity regulations-controlled substance and
alcohol testing
Government Code § 53075.5 (amended); Public Utilities Code §§
1032.1, 120269 (new); § 5374 (amended); Vehicle Code § 34520
(amended).
SB 46 (Ayala); 1995 STAT. Ch. 405
Under existing law, commercial motor carriers' must submit to controlled
substance2 and alcohol testing prior to employment or licensing, after accidents,
6. SENATECOMMITrEEONTRANSPORTATION,COMMITrEEANALYSIS OFSB 307, at I (Mar. 21, 1995);
see SENATE ComirrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 307, at 2 (Apr. 18, 1995)
(stating that, by establishing a wobblette offense where the authorities have discretion to charge an individual
with a more severe crime depending upon the circumstances, an additional purpose of SB 307 is met by
allowing the enforcing officer to look at the circumstances of each case and apply a misdemeanor in those
situations warranting a stricter penalty). But see SENATE COMMrrrE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 307, at 2 (Mar. 21, 1995) (noting that although Department of Motor Vehicles representatives
confirm that individuals attempt to cheat on licensing examinations or hire impersonators to complete their
tests, such occurrences are not widespread and that it is unclear whether increasing the penalty will result in
increased enforcement since there is a lack of resources to enhance such enforcement).
7. ASSEMBLY COMUTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 307, at 2 (June 19,
1995); see id. (commenting that the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice had argued that the prior system
where a first conviction resulted in an infraction and any subsequent conviction resulted in a misdemeanor was
appropriate).
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 408 (West 1987) (defining a "motor carrier" as the registered owner, lessee,
licensee or bailee of a vehicle listed in California Vehicle Code § 34500 who operates or controls the operation
of the vehicle); id. § 34500(a)-(k) (West Supp. 1995) (listing a variety of motor vehicles, including the
following: (1) trucks with three or more axles that weigh more than 10,000 pounds; (2) truck tractors, buses,
trailers or semi-trailers with a towing motor vehicle meant to transport 10 or more people; (3) truck and trailer
or semi-trailer exceeding 40 feet in length; (4) hazardous materials transport trucks; (5) park trailers; (6)
commercial motor vehicles weighing 26,001 pounds or more; or (7) commercial motor vehicles towing a trailer
or semi-trailer with a combined weight of more than 10,000 pounds; but excluding camp trailers, trailer
coaches, and utility trailers).
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11007, 11054-11058 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (describing
"controlled substances," such as opiates, codeine, stimulants, depressants, barbiturates, narcotics, and anabolic
steroids).
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randomly, or when there is reasonable suspicion of job performance impairment.3
These test results cannot be used in a criminal proceeding concerning unlawful
possession, sale or distribution of controlled substances.4
Under Chapter 405, taxicab drivers are subject to this same testing.5 Chapter
405 outlines the city or county alcohol and controlled substance testing program.
6
A similar program is also required prior to issuance of a certificate of public
3. CAL. VEH. CODE § 34520(a) (amended by Chapter 405); see id. (incorporating federal controlled
substance and alcohol testing as required by Part 382 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations); see also
49 C.F.R. § 382.301(a) (1995) (imposing preemployment controlled substance and alcohol testing); id. §
382.303(a) (1995) (requiring post-accident controlled substance and alcohol testing); id. § 382.305 (1995)
(mandating random controlled substance and alcohol testing); id. § 382.307(a), (b) (1995) (imposing testing
when there is reasonable suspicion of impairment due to controlled drug and alcohol); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-276a(d) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring controlled substance testing of school bus drivers); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2708(a)(3) (Supp. 1994) (mandating controlled substance testing of "potential" school
bus drivers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 234.091 (West Supp. 1995) (imposing controlled substance testing testing of
school bus drivers); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1121(a) (Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring "drug" testing of school
bus drivers); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 516 106.1(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (mandating controlled
substance testing of school bus drivers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.2-14 (1993) (permitting drug and alcohol
testing of school bus drivers at the discretion of the school board); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-178(C) (Michic
Supp. 1994) (authorizing controlled substance and alcohol testing of school bus drivers). See generally Atkins
v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs., 830 F. Supp. 1169, 1176 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality of
controlled drug testing for school bus drivers); 1991 S.C. AG LEXIS 230, *2-3 (Nov. 7. 1991) (stating that
random controlled substance testing of school bus drivers can be included in an annual fitness physical); id.
at *8 (noting that random controlled substance testing of school bus drivers has been upheld in several states
where the program is motivated by safety concerns).
4. CAL. VEI. CODE § 34520(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 405).
5. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 53075.5(bX3) (amended by Chapter 405); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5374(a)(2),
(b)(1)(I) (amended by Chapter 405); see id. § 5374(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 405) (requiring controlled
substance and alcohol testing for issuance or renewals of a taxi driver's permit); id. § 5374(b)(1)(I) (amended
by Chapter 405) (requiring controlled substance and alcohol testing for issuance or renewal of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity as provided for in section 1032.1(a)); cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 14.44(b)
(West Supp. 1994) (mandating that controlled substance and alcohol testing results be provided if they exist
for licensing of taxicab drivers).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53075.5(b)(3)(A) (amended by Chapter 405); see id. (describing the testing
program as similar to the testing program required in Part 40 and Part 382 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations and including the following: (1) mandatory negative test results for each controlled substance
listed in Part 40 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations and alcohol prior to employment or self-
employment, upon permit renewal, or other designated times; (2) presentation of a California driver's license
upon testing; (3) the allowance of tests available in one jurisdiction for use in any jurisdiction; (4) the
satisfaction of the periodic testing requirement based on a negative test result during the past year if a
subsequent positive test result has not occurred except in the case of a pre-employment testing requirement;
(5) direct reporting of test results of a self-employed driver to the city or county which will then notify the
leasing company of record if the results are positive; (6) reporting of other test results to the employer who may
be required to report the results to the city or county; and (7) providing upon request a list of testing consortia
near the jurisdiction to permit applicants); id. § 53075.5(b)(3)(A)(i) (amended by Chapter 405) (defining a
"negative alcohol test result" as a breath alcohol concentration of less than 0.02%); id. § 53075.5(e) (amended
by Chapter 405) (providing that this section applies to independent drivers). See generally People v. Randolph,
213 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5 n.1, 262 Cal. Rptr. 378, 380 n.1 (1989) (defining "blood-alcohol concentration
level" as the percent, by weight, of alcohol in the bloodstream as determined through a blood, breath, or urine
test).
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convenience and necessity.7 Any transportation service licensed or regulated by
a transit development board must also be tested through a similar program
However, positive test results may not be used as evidence in a criminal
prosecution.'0
While various government agencies are responsible for administering this
program, the costs will be recovered from the employer or self-employed
individual who will be responsible for the costs of the testing program and other
fees imposed to operate the program."
Existing law mandates that each city and county develop policies related to
entering the taxi transportation business.'2 Chapter 405 lists specific policies
which must be included.
1 3
Under existing law, peace officers 4 were not exempt from the controlled
7. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1032.1(a), (b), (d)-(f) (enacted by Chapter 405); see id. § 1032.1(b)
(amended by Chapter 405) (describing the testing program as similar to the testing program required in Part
40 and Part 382 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations and includes the following: (1) mandatory
negative test results for each controlled substance listed in Part 40 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations and alcohol prior to employment or self-employment, upon permit renewal, or other designated
times; (2) presentation of a California driver's license upon testing; (3) the satisfaction of the periodic testing
requirement based on a negative test result during the past year if a subsequent positive test result has not
occurred except in the case of a pre-employment testing requirement; (4) report test results of a self-employed
driver directly to the commission; (5) report other test results to the employer (6) random and for-cause
inspections of an applicant's documents indicating compliance; (7) confidentiality of test results; and (8)
providing upon request a list of testing consortia near the jurisdiction to certificate applicants); id. §
1032.1(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 405) (defining a "negative alcohol test result" as a breath alcohol
concentration of less than 0.02%); see also id. § 1031 (West 1994) (requiring passenger stage corporations to
obtain a certificate indicating public convenience and necessity from the Public Utility Commission prior to
operation).
8. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 120050 (West 1991) (creating the San Diego Metro Transit
Development Board in San Diego County).
9. Id. § 120269(a), (b) (enacted by Chapter 405).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53075.5(b)(3)(B) (amended by Chapter 405); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§
1032.1(c), 120269(c) (enacted by Chapter 405).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53075.5(b)(3)(A)(vi), (c) (amended by Chapter 405); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 1032.1(b)(6) (enacted by Chapter 405); id. § 5374(a)(2), (b)(1)(I) (amended by Chapter 405).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53075.5(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 405).
13. Id.; see id. (requiring the enactment by each city and county of policies related to entering the taxi
transportation business, including the following: (1) employment or an offer of employment prior to issuing
a taxi driver's permit, (2) termination of the permit upon termination of the employment, (3) return of the
permit upon termination of the employment, (4) notification to the city or county by the taxi driver's employer
upon termination of employment, and (5) a permit stating the employer's name).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officers" to include the
following: (1) county sheriffs, undersheriffs, or deputy sheriffs; (2) city chief of police; (3) district chiefs of
police or police officers authorized to maintain a police department; (4) municipal court marshals or deputy
marshals; (5) judicial district constables or deputy constables; (6) port wardens or special officers of the Harbor
Department of the City of Los Angeles; (7) district attorney inspectors or investigators; (8) Department of
Justice special agents; (9) Attorney General investigators; or (10) assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs, chiefs, deputy
directors or division directors designated by the Attorney General as peace officers); id. § 830.2 (West Supp.
1995) (defining "peace officers" to include the following: (1) California Highway Patrol officers, (2)
California State Police Division officers, (3) University of California Police Department or California State
University Police Departments employees whose primary duty is law enforcement within an area, (4)
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substances and alcohol use and testing requirements. 5 Under Chapter 405, peace




Chapter 405 will promote safety among smaller commercial carriers.' 7 The
federal government mandates testing for commercial drivers who transport
hazardous wastes, sixteen or more people, or whose vehicles exceed 26,001
pounds. 18 However, controlled substance testing by employers has been
questioned as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 19
Department of Correction Law Enforcement Liaison Unit officers, (5) Department of Fish and Game officer,
(6) Department of Parks and Recreation officers, (7) the Director of Forestry and Fire Protection and his
officers, (8) employees of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control who enforce laws concerning
alcoholic beverages, or (9) California Exposition and State Fair marshals and police); see also People v. Corey,
21 Cal. 3d 738, 747, 581 P.2d 644, 649, 147 Cal. Rptr. 639, 644 (1978) (holding that a uniformed city police
officer performing private security work for compensation is not a peace officer).
15. CAL. VEH. CODE § 34520(a)-(e) (amended by Chapter 405); see id. (outlining controlled substance
and alcohol use and testing requirements and the penalties for violation).
16. Id. § 34520(0 (amended by Chapter 405).
17. SENATE CO.NIsTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 46, at 2 (May 11, 1995);
see Joel Broadway, 300 City Workers to Be Tested for Drugs and Alcohol, WIs. STATE J., Feb. 7, 1995, at 1 B
(reporting that all commercial drivers, including taxicab drivers, will be subject to random, preemployment,
post-accident and suspicion of impairment drug testing in Madision, Wisconsin); Mark Somerson, 'Aggressive
Policy' Is in Work to Clean up City's Tax Industry, COLtUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 22, 1993, at IA (indicating
how the city is considering implementing planned alcohol and drug testing for cab drivers); Mark Somerson,
Airport Sets Criteria for Cabs, Drivers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 15, 1994, at 5C (citing the Columbus
airport's criteria in a request for bid for taxicab management contract as including random drug and alcohol
testing in an endeavor to improve cab service).
18. 49 C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (1994); see id. (mandating controlled substance testing be performed by
commercial motor carriers involved in interstate or intrastate commerce and performing safety-sensitive
activities). See generally 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.01-.I 11 (1994) (describing testing and re-testing precedures, as well
as laboratery guidelines); id. §§ 382.101-.507 (1994) (outlining purpose of regulations, procedures for testing
results, timing of testing and penalties for violation); id. § 382.107 (1994) (defining "commercial motor
carriers" as vehicles over26,001 pounds, carrying more than 16 people or transporting hazardous material; also
defining "safety-sensitive activities" as those on-duty activities listed in Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations § 395.2, paragraphs (1) through (7)); id. § 395.2 (1994) (describing on-duty activities for com-
mercial carriers as the following: (1) waiting to be dispatched; (2) inspecting and servicing the commercial
vehicle; (3) driving, including time spent within the vehicle except during a resting period within a sleeper
berth; (4) loading and unloading the vehicle, and supervision thereof; (5) repairing, obtaining assistance and
remaining with a disabled vehicle; and (6) testing for controlled substances, including the travel time to and
from the testing site).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 678-79 (1989) (holding that controlled substance
testing for promotion to a position which required the carrying of a firearm does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, based on weighing the privacy expectations of customs agents against the governmental interests
in public safety and secure borders); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1989)
(finding that controlled substance testing of railway employees does not violate the Fourth Amendment based
on weighing the privacy expectations of a heavily regulated industry's employees and the governmental interest
in public safety); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2391 v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir.
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The Supreme Court has differentiated between administrative searches and
searches pursuant to a criminal investigation. 20 The constitutionality of
administrative searches is determined by balancing the government interests
against the reasonable expectations of the individual's privacy.2' Administrative
searches have been noted to include searches conducted for the purpose of
regulating public safety.2 2 The courts have found that, after balancing the
government interests against the individual's expectation of privacy, controlled
substance testing is not an unreasonable search and seizure as proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment when any of the following conditions are met: (1) testing is
done on applicants, (2) there is a reasonable suspicion of job performance
impairment, or (3) the employment position concerns sensitive information or
safety-sensitive activitiesO
Chapter 405 regulates transportation of the public, clearly a safety-sensitive
1992) (stating that controlled substance testing of Department of Labor employees involved in public health
and safety and safety-sensitive positions does not violate the Constitution); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Dept. of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that all types of Department of Trans-
portation controlled substance testing are constitutional based on the substantial public interests in
transportation safety and the slight expectations of employees in a heavily regulated industry who are already
subject to a physical exam); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that
mandatory preemployment controlled substance testing by the Department of Justice was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment because the applicant had notice of the test, the applicant had lower expectations of privacy
since the hiring process involved extensive background checks, and the applicant could choose to withdraw
his application), cert. denied, Willner v. Barr, 502 U.S. 1020 (1991); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1500 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that controlled substance testing of health care
workers and motor vehicle operators which carry passengers does not violate the Constitution).
20. O'Conner v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,713-25 (1987); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-39
(1967); see O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 713-25 (differentiating searches pursuant to a criminal investigation and
administrative searches); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-39 (discussing the reduced standards for an administrative
search, in contrast to a search pursuant to a criminal investigation); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1347,
743 P.2d 1299, 1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 60 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints
because the government's public safety interest in maintaining safe roadways outweighs the intrusiveness of
the search).
21. O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 724-25; Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
22. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
23. See National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 678-79 (holding that controlled substance
testing for promotion to a position which required the carrying of a firearm did not violate the Fourth
Amendment due to safety-sensitive concerns); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-21 (finding that controlled substance
testing of railway employees does not violate the Fourth Amendment due to public safety concerns); Martin,
969 F.2d at 793 (stating that controlled substance testing of certain Department of Labor employees does not
violate the Constitution due to the employee's safety-sensitive position); International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932
F.2d at 1309 (holding that all types of Department of Transportation controlled substance testing are
constitutional based on the safety-sensitive nature of commercial transportation); Willner, 928 F.2d at 1193-94
(finding that mandatory preemployment controlled substance testing by the Department of Justice was not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment since the testing was required of applicants); Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at
1500 (stating that controlled substance testing of health care workers and motor vehicle operators which carry
passengers does not violate the constitution due to public safety issues).
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activity.24 While the federal government does not mandate testing for taxicab
drivers, the smaller number of people transported by taxicab or limousine drivers
does not lessen the possibility of injury or the government's interest in public
safety.Y Also, Chapter 405 prohibits the results from being used in a criminal
investigation.2 Thus, Chapter 405 should withstand constitutional scrutiny based
on its relation to safety-sensitive activities and its foundation as an administrative
search, rather than a search pursuant to a criminal investigation 7
June D. Coleman
Transportation and Motor Vehicles; toll evasion
Streets and Highways Code §§ 30842, 30846 (repealed); §§ 27174.1,
30843 (amended); Vehicle Code §§ 4770, 4771,4772, 4773, 4773.5,
4774, 4775, 23302.5, 40250, 40251, 40252, 40253, 40254, 40255,
40256, 40257, 40258, 40259, 40260, 40261, 40262, 40262.5, 40263,
40264, 40265, 40266, 40267, 40268, 40269, 40270, 40271, 40272,
40273 (new); § 23302 (amended).
AB 1223 (Pringle); 1995 STAT. Ch. 739
Prior law treated both toll evasion and fraudulent or forcible avoidance of
24. See supra notes 5-11 and 17, and accompanying text; International Blidt of Teamsters, 932 F.2d
at 1309 (holding that the safety-sensitive nature of commercial motor carriers permits the controlled substance
testing mandated by the Department of Transportation to withstand constitutional scrutiny based on the
substantial public interest in transportation safety and the slight privacy expectations of employees in a heavily
regulated industry); Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1500 (upholding the constitutionality of controlled substance
testing of motor vehicle operators which carry passengers due to the safety-sensitive nature of their position).
25. See 49 C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (1994) (limiting controlled substance testing to commercial motor
carriers involved in interstate or intrastate commerce); id. § 382.107 (1994) (defining "commercial motor
carriers" as vehicles weighing more than 26,001 lbs., carrying more than 16 people or transporting hazardous
wastes); National Treasury Emp. Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968, 972 (1990) (stating the court's opinion that
the safety interest does not decrease if the number of passengers decreases); SENATE COMMrITEE ON
TRANSPORTATION, CoM -TrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 46, at 2 (Apr. 18, 1995) (indicating that current federal
legislation does not require taxicab drivers to submit to controlled substance testing). See generally Safety and
Health Improvement and Regulatory Reform Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1834 Before the Subcomm. on
Workforce Protections of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., Et
Sess. (July 27, 1995) (statement of Donald E. Cramer, Motorola Corporation and Director, Institute for a Drug-
Free Workplace) (describing the nature of the drug abuse problem, particularly citing a National Institute on
Drug Abuse report that shows that employees who use drugs on the job are 3.6 times more likely to be involved
in a workplace accident). For taxi and limousine drivers, workplace accidents would occur more often on the
roads. Id.
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53075.5(b)(3)(B) (amended by Chapter 405); CAL, PUB. UTIL. CODE §§
1032.1(c), 120269(c) (enacted by Chapter 405); CAL. VEH. CODE § 34520(b)(3) (amended by Chapter 405).
27. See supra note 23-26 and accompanying text.
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tolls as misdemeanors.' Chapter 739 changes toll evasion from a criminal offense
to a civil offense and establishes procedures for enforcing civil penalties against
violators.
Chapter 739 separates the responsibilities associated with the administration
of toll facilities into two distinct components: (1) collection of tolls and (2)
collection of penalties Issuing agencies 4 are charged with the duty of collecting
tolls.5 Processing agencies,6 on the other hand, are assigned the task of processing
notices of penalties from toll evasion violations.7 Chapter 739 authorizes issuing
agencies to contract with processing agencies for the collection of penalties or to
assume that duty themselves.
Chapter 739 provides for unpaid toll evasion penalties9 to be collected from
violators at the time they pay their vehicle registration fees to the Department of
Motor Vehicles.'0 Chapter 739 instructs the Department to refuse the renewal of
vehicle registration from any owner who has an outstanding toll evasion violation
penalty." Upon receipt of payment for a penalty, the Department is to return the
amount collected, less an administrative fee which it is permitted to retain, to the
appropriate agency.' 2 Chapter 739 also allows processing agencies to obtain
penalty payments by securing a civil judgment from a court or by contracting
1. 1947 Cal. Stat. ch. 176, sec. 1, at 733 (enacting CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 30842); see id.
(punishing any person who evades a toll payment through force or fraud with a $10 penalty); id. sec. 1, at 733-
34 (enacting CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 30846) (assessing a penalty upon any person who passes through a
toll with the intent not to make the required payment and does not make such payment).
2. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23302.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. (declaring the evasion of tolls a
civil violation); id. (establishing that California Vehicle Code §§ 40250 through 40273, enacted by Chapter
739, are to govern the enforcement of toll evasion penalties); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1001(1) (West Supp.
1995) (classifying toll evasion as a noncriminal traffic offense which is to be treated as a moving violation);
N.Y. PUB. AtrrH. LAW § 2985(1) (McKinney 1995) (creating civil liability in the owner of a vehicle which has
been found to have violated a toll collection regulation).
3. CAL. VEI. CODE § 40252(a) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. (permitting the agency charged with
collecting tolls to contract with other entities to process notices of toll evasion violations and delinquent toll
evasion violations).
4. See id. § 40250(e) (enacted by Chapter 739) (defining "issuing agency" as any public or private
entity which is empowered to collect tolls).
5. Id.
6. See id. § 40253 (enacted by Chapter 739) (defining "processing agency" as the party assigned the
responsibility of processing notices of toll evasions penalties and delinquent toll evasion penalties).
7. Id.
8. Id. § 40252(a) (enacted by Chapter 739).
9. See id. § 40252(b) (enacted by Chapter 739) (defining "toll evasion penalty" to include any
penalties for late payment, administrative fees, fines, assessments, and costs of collection).
10. Id. § 40267(a) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. (allowing processing agencies to file the names of
violators with the Department of Motor Vehicles which shall collect penalties, administrative fees, and service
fees in accordance with California Vehicle Code § 4770); id. § 4770(a) (enacted by Chapter 739) (authorizing
the Department to collect unpaid toll evasion penalties at the time of application for renewal of registration).
11. Id. § 4770(a) (enacted by Chapter 739); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.1001(5) (West Supp. 1995)
(directing the Department of Motor Vehicles not to provide a license plate or revalidation sticker to any motor
vehicle with three or more unpaid toll evasion penalties).
12. CAL. VEH. CODE § 4772 (enacted by Chapter 739).
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with a collection agency.'3
Chapter 739 holds all registered owners, 4 drivers,' 5 rentees, and lessees' 6 of
any vehicle found to have evaded a toll jointly and severally liable for the
accompanying penalty. 7 Chapter 739 allows a registered owner, upon receiving
a notice of a toll evasion penalty, to file an affidavit of nonliability if the car had
been leased, rented, or sold to another person at the time of the offense. 8 A party
may contest a notice of toll evasion violation in which case the processing agency
must either examine its records or instruct the issuing agency to conduct an
investigation into the circumstances behind the alleged violation. 9 If the party is
not satisfied with the agency's findings, he or she may request an administrative
review.20 A party may appeal the decision of an administrative review to a muni-
cipal court, which will conduct a de novo review of the case.2
Chapter 739 states that a toll evasion offense is not to be considered a con-
viction or made a part of the driving record of any registered owner, driver,
rentee, or lessee of a motor vehicle and is not to be used by insurance providers
when determining coverage.22 Chapter 739 provides for each private issuing
agency and local authority which uses the services of the Department of Motor
Vehicles to reimburse the Department for the initial cost which it incurs in the
13. Id. § 40267(b)-(d) (enacted by Chapter 739).
14. See id. § 460 (West 1987) (defining "owner" as a person who has all of the components of
ownership, including legal title, regardless of whether or not that person lends, rents, or establishes a security
interest in another party).
15. See id. § 305 (West 1987) (defining "driver" as the person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a vehicle).
16. See id. § 371 (West 1987) (defining a "lessee" as a person, including a bailee, who leases, 6ffer;
to lease, or is offered the lease of a motor vehicle for a term of more than four months).
17. Id. § 40250(b) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. § 40258(a) (enacted by Chapter 739) (setting a
maximum penalty for the first offense at $100, the second offense within a year at $250, and each additional
offense within a year at $500); see also id. § 40262.5 (enacted by Chapter 739) (stating that if the registered
owner does not either pay or contest the toll evasion penalty, he or she will be held liable for the penalty by
operation of law); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.100](2)(c) (West Supp. 1995) (holding the owner of a motor
vehicle found to have evaded a toll liable for any resulting penalty).
18. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 40263-40265 (enacted by Chapter 739); cf. FLA. STAT. ANt. § 316.1001(2)(c)
(vest Supp. 1995) (excusing owners who can show that the vehicle was not in their care, control, or custody
at the time of the offense).
19. CAL. VEI. CODE § 40255(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. (enacted by Chapter 739)
(allowing a party 21 days from the time the notice of toll evasion violation was issued or 15 days from the date
the notice of delinquent toll evasion violation was mailed to contest the violation).
20. Id. § 40255(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. § 40255(b)(l)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 739)
(establishing standards for the agency to follow regarding (1) the form of the review, (2) cases involving
minors, (3) the qualifications of the reviewer, (4) the cooperation of the issuing agency, and (5) the
promulgation of written procedures for conducting administrative reviews).
21. Id. § 40256(a) (enacted by Chapter 739).
22. Id. § 40272 (enacted by Chapter 739); cf N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 2985(6) (McKinney 1995)
(declaring that a violation of a toll collection regulation is not to be considered a conviction, nor will it become
a part of the violator's record or be used by insurance companies).
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implementation of Chapter 739 as well as fifty percent of the continuation costs.23
COMMENT
In 1988, California passed legislation authorizing the construction of four
privately operated toll roads.24 By changing toll evasion from a criminal violation
to a civil offense, Chapter 739 gives the private operators of highways a
statutorily authorized right to collect penalties owed to them by toll evaders.25
Chapter 739 also offers the services of the California Department of Motor
Vehicles to help private operators in the collection of toll evasion penalties 
6
The general policy in California has always been to discourage tolls so that
highways could be available to all.27 The federal government had once been
disinclined to provide federal financing for the construction of toll roads.
2
8
However, as the condition of existing highways have deteriorated and traffic
congestion has increased, one suggested solution to these problems, and to the
lack of funds to deal with them, has been the construction of new toll roads.29
In 1987 the United States enacted the Toll Road Pilot Program, which marked
the first time the federal government allowed money from the federal highway
trust fund to be used for construction of a new toll road.30  Orange County was
among the recipients of federal assistance not only because it demonstrated a need
for congestion relief, but because the toll road was approved by voter initiative,
23. CAL. Srs. & HIGH. CODE § 4773.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 739); see id. (defining the initial costs
to be the one-time costs which the Department must pay in order to comply with the requirements of Chapter
739).
24. Id. § 143 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (permitting the State to contract for four new highways to be
built by members of the private sector).
25. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23302.5(b) (amended by Chapter 739); see id. (declaring the evasion of tolls to
be neither an infraction nor a public offense, but rather a civil violation).
26. Id. § 40267(a) (enacted by Chapter 739); see SENATE COMMt-rE ON TRANSPORTATON,
Coxsm~rEE ANALYSIS OFAB 1223, at 3 (July 18, 1995) (declaring the intent of the Legislature to assist private
toll road operators by directing the Department of Motor Vehicles to act as a collection agency for them).
27. See Jay Matthews, "Highway Robbery" in California?; Western Animosity to Toll Roads May Be
Forced to Take Back Seat, WASH. POST, July 26, 1987, at A3 (quoting the reactions of various state lawmakers
who stated that tolls are, "foreign to our [Californians'] way of life," "a form of highway robbery," and
"absolutely wrong for California"); id. (reporting that California has only one private road and 10 toll bridges).
28. See Tom Lankard, From Freeways to Fee-Ways, AUTOWEEK, Sept. 3, 1990, at 19 (stating that of
the 41,000 miles of interstate highways, only 2800 miles are toll roads).
29. Kant Rao, et al., Role of Toll Financing in the State Programming Process: Models and Results,
TRANSP. J., June 22, 1992, at 17; see id. (crediting highway disrepair, and congested roads as well as increased
interest in privatization, more efficient toll collection methods, and lack of traditional funding for the new
willingness to accept toll roads); see also Matthews, supra note 27 (reporting that Caltrans considers a highway
to be congested when, over a 2 to 3 hour period, traffic slows to under 35 m.p.h. and that Orange County
congestion has increased, between 1970 and 1987, from 3 miles of highway to 148).
30. 101 Stat. 157 (1987); see id. (permitting funds to be used only for public, not private toll roads);
see also Rao, et al., supra note 29, at 26 (stating that for the first time federal funds were being used to build
toll roads in nine states, including California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia).
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which showed a willingness by the voters to subject themselves to the tolls:'
With the federal government providing monetary assistance, and tolls exacted
directly from drivers, the State is placed in a better financial position to fund more
transportation projects.32 In 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act was enacted, which added to the provisions of the Toll Road Pilot
Program by allowing any State to apply for funds to be used for toll roads and
increasing the maximum contribution to fifty percent?
3
California passed legislation in 1987 to permit the State to enter into contracts
for the construction and operation of four toll bridges by private parties. 4 Under
the legislation, the private entity is to independently finance and construct the
agreed upon highway and then transfer ownership to the State which, in turn,
would lease it back to the company. 35 The company would then be allowed to
charge a user fee on the highway in order to make a profit.36 After thirty-five
years, the company would have to relinquish all rights to the highway to the
State.37 Allowing the private sector to construct, maintain, and operate highways
will result in faster construction of highways, more cost effective operation, and
better maintenance.38
Christopher P. Blake
31. 101 Stat. 100-117 (1987); see id. (limiting federal investment to 35% of the project cost); see also
Rao, et al., supra note 29, at 21 (detailing the factors which made Orange County an ideal candidate for federal
funding).
32. Rao, et al., supra note 29, at 22; see id. (citing California's ability to contribute greater state funds
to high cost projects which could not have been afforded without the extra income from tolls).
33. 105 Stat. 102-240 (1991).
34. CAL. STs. & HtGH. CODE § 143 (West Supp. 1995); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-3051 to 28-
3075 (Supp. 1994) (detailing the establishment of privately-operated, publicly-owned transportion facility pilot
projects in Arizona); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-556 to 56-575 (Michie 1995); (outlining Virginia's rccently
enacted Public-Private Transportation Act, permitting private companies to construct and operate highways
for a fee); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47.46.010 to 47.46.900 (West Supp. 1995) (approving six public-private
demonstration projects in the state of Washington). See generally James T. Drummond, A New Era in Road
Policy, NATION's BUS., Sept. 1991, at 20 (mentioning California and Virginia's experiments with private
company operation of roads).
35. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 143(b) (West Supp. 1995).
36. Id. § 143(d) (West Supp. 1995).
37. Id. § 143(b) (West Supp. 1995); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-566(A)(9) (Michic 1995) (stating that the
date for return of the highway to the state is to be a subject of negotiation prior to the private operator acquiring
any rights).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-558(A)(3) (Michie 1995); fee id. (declaring the Virginia General Assembly's
findings that allowing private parties to construct, improve, maintain, and operate highways will lead to the
more timely and less costly construction of such roads); see also Drummond, supra note 34 (claiming that
private toll roads can be built faster and maintained better than public roads).
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Transportation and Motor Vehicles; towing and impoundment
Civil Code § 3074 (repealed and new); § 3068.1 (amended); Vehicle
Code § 22851.12 (repealed and new); §§ 14607.6, 22658, 22851, 25253
(amended).
SB 240 (Ayala); 1995 STAT. Ch. 404
Under prior law, if a request to release a vehiclet from an impoundment
storage facility was made within twenty-four hours from the time the vehicle was
brought in, regardless of the calendar date, the storage charge could be for one
day only.2 Chapter 404 makes that limitation on storage charges applicable only
if the vehicle is released within twenty-four hours from the time the vehicle was
brought in.3 Moreover, if a request to release a vehicle is made with the
appropriate tender and fees within the initial twenty-four hours of storage, and the
storage facility is unable to comply with the request or is not open for business
during normal business hours, then only one day's charge may be required until
after the first business day. 4 However, if the request is made more than twenty-
four hours after the vehicle is placed in storage, charges may be imposed on a full
calendar day basis for each day, or part thereof, that the vehicle is in storage.5
Under existing law, when a vehicle is removed and taken to a garage for
impoundment, the garage keeper may have a lien dependent upon possession for
towing and storing the vehicle.6 Furthermore, the garage keeper's possession of
1. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 670 (West 1987) (defining "vehicle" as a device which may be used to
propel move, or draw upon a highway any person with the exception of a device moved exclusively by human
power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks).
2. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 799, sec. 2, at 3377-78 (amending CAL. Civ. CODE § 3068.1); 1994 Cal.
Legis. Serv. ch. 1220, sec. 63, at 6212-14 (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658).
3. CAL. CtV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(i)(3) (amended
by Chapter 404). See generally 4 B.E. WrriN, STMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Personal Property § 187 (9th
ed. 1987) (discussing California Civil Code § 3068).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(i)(3) (amended
by Chapter 404); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404) (defining a "business day" as any
day in which the lienholder is open for business to the public for at least eight hours).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22658(i)(3) (amended
by Chapter 404).
6. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22851(a)(1) (amended
by Chapter 404); see id. (stating that whenever a vehicle has been removed to a garage and the garage keeper
has received a notice, the keeper has a lien dependent upon possession for his or her compensation for towing,
caring, and keeping the vehicle safe for a period of up to 60 days; on the other hand, if an application for an
authorization to conduct a lien sale has been filed pursuant to § 3068.1 of the Civil Code within 30 days after
the removal of the vehicle to the garage, for up to 120 days and, if the vehicle is not recovered by the owner
within that time or the owner is unknown, the garage keeper may satisfy his or her lien); id. § 22851(b)
(amended by Chapter 404) (noting that the lien does not attach to any personal property in or on the vehicle;
therefore, any personal property in or on the vehicle will be given to the current registered owner or an
authorized agent upon demand); id. (stating that the lienholder is not responsible for property after any vehicle
has been disposed of pursuant to law); see also Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa, 607 F. Supp. 975, 983 (D.C. Cal.
1985) (holding that due process does not require a hearing before a city can tow a motorist's automobile), aft'd,
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the vehicle is deemed to arise when the vehicle is removed and is in transit.7
Chapter 404 adds that the garage keeper's possession is deemed to arise when the
vehicle is removed and is in transit, when a tow truck is connected to the vehicle,
or when vehicle recovery operations or load salvage operations that have been
requested by a law enforcement agency have begun at the scene.!
798 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1986); Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a private towing company did not deprive plaintiff of property without due process of law by
taking possession of plaintiff's illegally parked vehicle and towing it to a storage garage at the direction of a
law enforcement officer, furthermore, plaintiff was not deprived of property without due process when the
storage garage refused to return the vehicle until the plaintiff paid the towing and storage charges, and when
the statute authorizing public officials to remove and store vehicles provided for post-seizure hearing within
48 hours, and for release of vehicle without payment of towing and storage fees); Berry v. Hannigan, 7 Cal.
App. 4th 587, 592, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 216 (1992) (holding that an operator of a towing and storage facility
was not deprived of property without due process of law by California Vehicle Code §§ 22651.1, and 22658(k)
by requiring towing and storage facilities operators to accept credit cards as payment from the vehicle owners
whose vehicles had been involuntarily towed; moreover, the operator's property interest was a lien requiring
possession of the vehicle, and possession was required to be surrendered upon presentation of a valid bank
credit card). But see Stypmann v. City and County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1345 (1977) (holding that
the provisions of the California Vehicle Code authorizing the removal of privately owned vehicles from streets
and highways without prior notice or opportunity for hearing, and the provisions of § 22851 establishing a
possessory lien for towage and storage fees without a hearing before or after the lien attaches, violate due
Irocess); cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.275(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1994) (granting any person engaged in the
business of storing or towing motor vehicles a lien on the motor vehicle, for the reasonable or agreed ,;toring
or towing charges, as long as it remains in his possession); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:33(l (1993) (stating
that all reasonable charges incurred as a result of a vehicle's removal and storage will provide the basis for a
lien against the vehicle which must be paid by the owner, custodian, or person claiming such vehicle, except
as otherwise provided); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.55.140(1) (West Supp. 1995) (granting to a registered
tow truck operator with a valid and signed impoundment authorization a lien upon the impounded vehicle for
services provided in the towing and storage of the vehicle, unless the impoundment is determined to have been
invalid); id. (noting further that the lien does not apply to personal property not permanently attached to or is
not an integral part of the vehicle); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.44(4) (West 1991) (stating that the cost of keeping
a vehicle constitutes a lien on the vehicle).
7. CAL CtV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22851 (a)(l) (amended
by Chapter 404); see People v. James, 122 Cal. App. 3d 25, 37-38, 177 Cal. Rptr. 110, 117-18 (1981) (holding
that under California Vehicle Code § 22851, which provides for a keeper's lien when a vehicle "hal, been
removed to a garage," the lien attaches when the vehicle has been placed within a storage facility; to construe
§ 22851 to provide for the attachment of a lien when a vehicle has been hoisted from the ground or removed
from the private property where it was parked would be to distort the plain meaning of the statute).
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3068.1(a) (amended by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 2285 1(a)(1) (amended
by Chapter 404). See generally David D. Walter, Comment, The Unconstitutional Seizure of Vehicles: Iowa
Towing Statutes Collide with the Federal Constitution, 73 IOWA L. REV. 495, 495 (1988) (stating that many
federal courts have determined that statutes or ordinances that allowed the towing or seizure of abandoned or
illegally parked vehicles, failed to provide for timely notice and therefore, were unconstitutional under th- Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution); David B. Harrison, Annotation, Garageman's
Lien for Towing and Storage of Motor Vehicle Towed From Private Property on Which Vehicle Was Parked
Without Permission, 85 A.L.R. 3D 240 (1978) (analyzing cases where a lien was placed upon a motor vehicle
for towing and storage charges that arise from the unconsented removal of such vehicle from private property
on which the vehicle was parked); David B. Harrison, Annotation, Lien For Towing or Storage, Ordered by
Public Officer, of Motor Vehicle, 85 A.LR. 3D 199 (1978) (discussing cases involving liens on motor vchicle
for charges claimed as compensation for storing or towing such vehicles in accordance with the directions of
a public officer); T.T.F. Huang, Annotation, Lien for Storage of Motor Vehicle, 48 A.L.R. 2D 894 (1956)
(discussing the rights of garage keepers to liens on motor vehicles for charges for storage); Andrea G. Nadel,
Pacific Law JournalVol. 271046
Transportation and Motor Vehicles
Chapter 404 further allows a lienholder to charge a fee for lien-sale
preparations, with certain limitations. 9 In addition, Chapter 404 allows the owner
of a vehicle to regain possession of the vehicle prior to its removal by a tow
truck 0 company as long as the owner pays the towing charges."
Existing law further requires impounding agencies, in instances where a
driver is caught for the second time driving with a suspended or revoked driver's
license, or driving without a driver's license, to notify within two days all
registered and legal owners that their vehicle has been impounded and is subject
to forfeiture.'2 Chapter 404 provides that if an impounding agency does not send
a notice of vehicle forfeiture to the legal owner within two working days of
impoundment, the impounding agency cannot charge the legal owner for more
than fifteen days of impoundment when the vehicle is redeemed. 3 Moreover,
Chapter 404 prohibits legal owners from being charged processing fees if the
impounded vehicle is redeemed within fifteen days of impoundment. 4
Annotation, State or Municipal Towing, Impounding, or Destruction of Motor Vehicles Parked or Abandoned
on Streets or Highways, 32 A.L.R. 4TH 728 (1984) (surveying state and federal cases which determine the
validity and construction of laws authorizing and regulating the towing, impounding, and disposition of
vehicles found in violation of traffic laws).
9. CAL CIV. CODE § 3074 (enacted by Chapter 404); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22851.12 (enacted by Chapter
404); see CAL. VEH. CODE § 22851.12 (enacted by Chapter 404) (stating that the lienholder may charge a fee
for lien-sale preparations of up to $70 in the case of a vehicle having a value determined to be $2500 or less,
and of up to $100 in the case of a vehicle having a value determined to be greater than $2500, from any person
who redeems the vehicle prior to disposal or paid through a lien sale); id. (noting further that these charges may
commence and become part of the possessory lien when the lienholder requests the names and addresses of
all persons having any interest in the vehicle from the Department of Motor Vehicles); id. (stating that not more
than 50% of the allowable fee may be charged until the lien-sale notifications are mailed to all interested parties
and the lienholder has possession of the required lien processing documents; moreover, this charge shall not
be made in the case of any vehicle redeemed prior to 72 hours from the initial storage); see also CAL. CiV.
CODE § 3071(a) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring a lienholder to apply to the department for the issuance of an
authorization to conduct a lien sale for any vehicle with a value determined to be over $2500); id. § 3072(b)
(West Supp. 1995) (requiring a lienholder to, immediately upon receipt of the names and addresses of the
registered and legal owners of a vehicle valued under $2500, send by certified mail with return receipt
requested, a completed Notice of Pending Lien Sale form, a blank Declaration of Opposition form, and a return
envelope preaddressed to the department, to the registered owner, legal owner, and to any other person known
to have an interest in the vehicle).
10. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 615(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "tow truck" as a motor vehicle which
has been altered or designed, equipped for, and primarily used in the business of, transporting vehicles by
means of a crane, hoist, tow bar, tow line, or dolly, or is otherwise primarily used to render vehicle assistance;
furthermore, a "roll-back carrier" designed to carry up to two vehicles is also a tow truck); id. (noting that a
trailer for hire being used to transport a vehicle is a tow truck, but that "tow truck" does not include an
automobile dismantlers' tow vehicle).
11. Id. § 22851(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 404).
12. Id. § 14607.6(e)(2) (amended by Chapter 404); see id. (providing that the notice must also include
instructions for filing a claim with the district attorney, the time limits for filing a claim, and must also inform
any legal owner of its right to conduct the sale).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 14607.6(e)(3) (amended by Chapter 404); see id. (declaring that if no claims are filed and
served within 15 days after the mailing of the notice, or if no claims are filed and served within five days of
personal service of the notice when no other mailed notice is required, the district attorney must prepare a
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Lastly, existing law requires tow trucks being used to tow disabled vehicles
to be equipped with flashing amber warning lights. t5 Chapter 404 excludes
tractor-trailer combinations from this requirement. 6
COMMENT
Chapter 404 was enacted to provide clarification and refinement of several
towing and impoundment provisions. 7 For example, the sponsors of Chapter 404
indicate that one purpose of Chapter 404 is to clarify that a mere request to
release a vehicle from impoundment, absent compliance with other procedures
and requirements, is not enough to stop the accrual of storage charges.'
8
Furthermore, the flashing amber warning light exemption for tractor-trailer
combinations is intended to ensure that vehicle combinations transporting
disabled vehicles are treated the same as other large vehicle combinations hauling
freight, which are not required to display flashing amber warning lights.'
9
Michelle M. Sheidenberger
Transportation and Motor Vehicles; violations-fines
Streets and Highways Code § 97 (new and repealed); Vehicle Code §
42010 (new and repealed).
SB 414 (Thompson); 1995 STAT. Ch. 841
Existing law outlines the powers and duties of the Department of Trans-
portation.' Chapter 841 requires that the Department of Transportation, in
written declaration of forfeiture of the vehicle to the state; written declaration of forfeiture signed by the district
attorney is deemed to provide good and sufficient title to the forfeited vehicle).
15. id. § 25253(a) (amended by Chapter 404); see id. § 25253(b) (amended by Chapter 404) (stating
that tow trucks may display flashing amber warning lamps while providing service to a disabled vehicle; the
flashing amber warning lamp may be displayed to the rear when the tow truck is towing a vehicle and moving
at a speed slower than the normal flow of traffic).
16. Id. § 25253(a) (amended by Chapter 404).
17. SENATE COMNIMTE ON TRANSPORTATION, CoMM=rrEE ANALYsIs OF SB 240, at 2 (May 2, 1995).
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. Id. at 2.
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14030 (West 1992); see id. (stating that the duties of the Department of
Transportation include the following: (1) cooperating with the transportation commission and other local
organizations to formulate a comprehensive transportation policy governing the intrastate movement of p ,oplc
and goods; (2) coordinating and assisting various public and private transportation organizations in
strengthening and developing certain transportation services in the advancement of statewide and regional
goals; (3) efficiently utilizing all resources that are available to state and local agencies for meeting California's
transportation needs; (4) planning, designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining certain transportation
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conjunction with the Department of the California Highway Patrol, develop three
state highway pilot projects.2 Moreover, Chapter 841 mandates that such portions
of the highways involved in the demonstration projects must be designated and
identified as "Safety Enhancement-Double Fine Zones."3
Chapter 841 doubles the prescribed fine for any misdemeanor driving offense
committed within a Safety Enhancement-Double Fine Zone including, but not
limited to, traffic violations relating to speed limits and those involving the use
and/or possession of alcoholic beverages.4 In the case of infractions, Chapter 841
increases the penalty imposed by law, as specified, for any violation committed
by the driver of a motor vehicle within the pilot project zones.5
systems, upon the order of the Legislature; (5) formulating and conducting research projects of statewide
interest; (6) carrying out the functions and duties delegated to the Department by the Legislature; (7)
investigating and reporting to the Secretary of the Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency the
consistency between federal, state, and local housing plans and programs, and transportation plans and
programs); id. § 14001 (West 1992) (creating the Department of Transportation).
2. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 97(a) (enacted by Chapter 841); see id. (stating that two projects will
be conducted in Northern California and one project will be conducted in Southern California); id. § 97(a)(1)
(enacted by Chapter 841) (designating Route 37, between the intersection with Route 121 and the intersection
With Route 29, as one of the pilot project sites); id. § 97(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 841) (naming Route 4,
between the intersection with the Cummings Skyway and the intersection with Route 80, as another location
for the pilot projects); id. § 97(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 841) (designating Route 74, between the intersection
with Route 5 and the intersection with the Riverside-Orange County line as the Southern California pilot
project site).
3. Id. § 97(a) (enacted by Chapter 841).
4. CAL. VEt. CODE § 42010(a) (enacted by Chapter 841); see id. § 42010(b) (enacted by Chapter 841)
(providing that the following list of offenses are subject to increased penalties if committed within Safety
Enhancement-Double Fine Zones: California Vehicle Code §§ 21650-21759, §§ 22348-22413, § 23103, §
23104, § 23109, § 23152, § 23153, § 23220, § 23221, § 23222, § 23223, § 23224, § 23225, § 23226); see also
id. §§ 21650-21759 (West 1971 & Supp. 1995) (relating to driving, overtaking, and passing); id. §§ 22348-
22413 (West 1971 & Supp. 1995) (concerning speed limits); id. § 23103 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "reckless
driving" as the driving of a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property); id.
(stating that a person found guilty of reckless driving will be fined between $145 and $1000); id. § 23104
(West 1985) (prescribing penalties for reckless driving resulting in bodily injury); id. § 23109 (West 1985)
(relating to speed contests and exhibitions of speed); id. § 23152 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting a person from
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol); id. (stating that it is unlawful for
a person with a blood alcohol level exceeding .08% to drive a motor vehicle); id. § 23153 (West Supp. 1995)
(relating to driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol that is the proximate cause of bodily injury to
another); id. § 23220 (West 1985) (prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages while driving); id. §
23221 (West 1985) (relating to drinking in a motor vehicle while on a highway); id. § 23222 (West 1985)
(restricting the presence of open alcoholic beverages containers in a vehicle while driving); id. § 23223 (West
1985) (proscribing the possession of an open alcoholic beverage container while driving or riding in a vehicle
upon a highway); id. § 23224 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting a person under the age of 21 from possessing
an open alcoholic beverage container in a vehicle); id. § 23225 (West 1985) (concerning the storage of open
alcoholic beverage containers in a vehicle); id. § 23226 (West 1985) (disallowing the storage of an opened
receptacle in a passenger compartment of a vehicle).
5. Id. § 42010(a) (enacted by Chapter 841); see id. (stating that in an infraction case the penalty
imposed will be one category higher than the penalty otherwise prescribed under the uniform traffic penalty
schedule); see also id. § 40310 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the Judicial Council must annually adopt
a uniform traffic penalty schedule); id. § 42001(a) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the fine for one infraction
shall not exceed $100; the fine for a second infraction in the same year shall not exceed $200; and that the fine
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Additionally, Chapter 841 requires that the Department of Transportation post
warning signs notifying motorists that increased penalties apply for traffic
violations that are committed within Safety Enhancement-Double Fine Zones.'
Chapter 841 also mandates that the civil liability of the state will not be
increased with its enactment.7 Finally, Chapter 841 provides for the repeal of the
pilot programs on January 1, 1998, and requires that the department provide the
Legislature with a report detailing the impact of the pilot programs on highway
safety at that time.8
COMMENT
Chapter 841 was enacted in response to an increasing number of fatalities
occurring on certain highway segments in California. 9 Such highways have come
to be known as "blood alleys" because of the dangerous conditions that these
for a third infraction in the same year as two prior infractions shall not exceed $250).
6. CAL- STs. & HIGH. CODE § 97(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter 841); see id. (stating that the Department
must adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards for warning signs notifying drivers that
increased fines will be imposed in these areas); id. (requiring that signs stating "Special Driving Zone Begins.
Here" and "Special Driving Zone Ends Here" must mark the beginning and end of Safety Enhancement-Double
Fine Zones); id. § 97(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 841) (declaring that the department or local authoritie; must
place or maintain warning signs that have been placed in their respective jurisdictions).
7. Id. § 97(c) (enacted by Chapter 841); see CAL GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980) (stating that a public
entity may be held liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition on its property if the following are
established: (1) The property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) the injiury was caused
by the dangerous condition, (3) the injury was a foreseeable risk resulting from the dangerous condition, (4)
the public entity was aware of the dangerous condition, and (5) the public entity failed to take measures to
correct the dangerous condition even though there was sufficient time to do so before the injury); see also
Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., 25 Cal. 3d 707,720,602 P.2d 755, 762, 159 Cal. Rptr. 835, 843 (1979) (holding the
State of California liable for failing to erect a median barrier to prevent head-on collisions); Ray Sotero, "Killer
Highway" Signs Sought for Route 37, MARIN INDEP. J., May 4. 1995, at A8 (noting the concern of the legal
community that designating the highways as safety hazards may expose the state to liability because it could
be interpreted as an admission that the road is dangerous). But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830(b) (West 1980)
(defining "protect against" for purposes of assessing liability as including providing safeguards against a
dangerous condition or warning of a dangerous condition); SENATE COMMrIrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 414, at 3 (Apr. 25, 1995) (questioning whether an argument can be made that
by increasing the fines issued on these highways, California is taking measures to protect against the dangerous
conditions).
8. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 97(b)(3) (enacted and by Chapter 841); id § 97(e) (enacted and repealed
by Chapter 841); see id. § 97(b)(3) (enacted and repealed by Chapter 841) (stating that the Department must
assess the success of the pilot programs and include in its report certain statistics, including, but not limited
to, the number of accidents, traffic injuries, and fatalities in the project zones); id. (declaring that the success
of the pilot projects must be indicated by a statistically significant decrease in the number of accidents, traffic
injuries, and fatalities that occur in the designated areas); id. § 97(e) (enacted and repealed by Chapter 841)
(providing for the repeal of the pilot projects unless a statute that is enacted on or before January 1, 1988,
deletes or extends that date).
9. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMITTrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 414, at 2 (Apr.
25, 1995) (stating that Highway 37 has been the site of at least 10 traffic deaths over the last five year,;) see
also Safety Proposal for Deadly Highway, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1995, at A22 (reporting that since 1990 there
have been 28 fatalities on the narrow strip of highway between Vallejo and Sears Point).
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highways present to drivers that fail to comply with existing laws.I °By increasing
the fines imposed for speeding and other traffic violations on these routes, the
Legislature hopes to curb the number of fatal accidents."'
Opponents argue, however, that increased enforcement of traffic laws in these
hazardous driving areas, rather than increased penalties, is the most effective way
to deter dangerous driving behavior.
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10. See ASSEiBLYCOMMITrEEoNTRANSPORTATION,COINTIEEANALYSISOFSB414, at 2 (June 19,
1995) (stating that, although measures, such as radar enforcement and engineering design, have been taken to
increase safety on the targeted highway segments, these segments continue to experience accidents that often
result in death or injury); see also SENATE CommmrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
SB 414, at 2 (Apr. 25, 1995) (stating that although the number of accidents occurring on Highway 37 is not
high, when compared to other highways, the crashes that do occur tend to be fatal). But see Meg McConahey,
Outrage After Double-Fatal Hwy. 37 Crash, PRESs DE iOCRAT (Sonoma, CA), May 10, 1995, at Al (noting
the contention of Caltrans officials that Highway 37 does not generate a disproportionate number of crashes
in that, on the Sonoma County side of the highway, the accident rate is 1.13 per million vehicle miles, only
slightly higher than the expected rate of 1.12 per million vehicle miles).
11. See Greg Lucas, A Vote to Raise Hwy. 37 Speed Fines State Senate Hopes to Cut Accidents, S.F.
CHRON., May 24, 1995, at AI8 (stating that, according to Senator Thompson, author of Ch. 841, every accident
on the 17-mile stretch of Highway 37 has occurred because of speed and that the best way to deter speeding
is to "get drivers in the pocketbook"); see also letter from Paul Yoder, Legislative Advocate, County of Solano,
to Assemblymember Richard Katz (June 13, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (asserting that
re-engineering the nine miles of Highway 37 that run from the Napa Bridge near Mare Island to Highway 121
is not possible, due to the presence of protected wetlands).
12. See Letter from Joel D. Anderson, Executive Vice President, California Trucking Association, to
Assemblymember Paula Boland (July 5, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (stating that there
are more effective ways of increasing highway safety than merely doubling the penalties); Letter from
Kimberly A. Bennion, Manager, Governmental Affairs, California State Automobile Association, and William
P. Halloran, Legislative Representative, Automobile Club of Southern California (June 15, 1995) (copy on file
with the Pacific Law Journal) (asserting that studies have revealed that when Highway 37 was subjected to
increased enforcement, driving behavior improved); id. (noting that despite a law enacted in 1993 that doubled
the fines for violations committed in construction zones, accidents in these zones continued to rise); see also
George C. Thomas III & David Edelman, Article: An Evaluation of Conservation Crime Control Theology,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 123, 137 n. 96 (1988) (revealing the results of studies showing that an increased risk
of apprehension, rather than merely increased penalties, have explained marginal deterrent effects detected
from a change in the law). See generally Gordon Bradford Tweedy, Nader's Failures?, 80 CAL. L. REV. 289
(1992) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990), and
explaining that highway and vehicle design changes may increase driver safety more effectively than methods
aimed at trying to change the behavior of ordinary people).
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